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Power, Freedom and Obedience in Foucault and La Boétie: voluntary servitude as the 
problem of government 
The phenomenon of obedience to power and authority has long been a concern of 
sociology and social theory. Although Weber (2004) defined the state in terms of a 
monopoly on violence, he was more interested in why people came to recognise its 
legitimacy.1 Studies of fascism and totalitarianism in the twentieth century drew attention 
to an ‘authoritarian personality’ – characterised by conservative attitudes and patriarchal 
beliefs – where the desire to dominate was only the flip-side of the desire to be dominated 
(see Adorno 1950; Reich 1946). However, the problem of obedience has become more 
ambiguous in late modern post-industrial societies, where the breaking down of 
traditional structures of authority – of the family, religious and political institutions and 
hierarchically organised businesses and workplaces (see Boltanski and Chiapello 2018) – 
seems to coincide with ever greater levels of obedience and docility. Our masters today, 
in the age of contemporary networked capitalism, are amorphous and obscure. Who, or 
what, precisely do we obey today? Is it politicians and elected officials, whose symbolic 
legitimacy has been dwindling for some time? Or is it, ultimately, ourselves, trapped, as 
philosopher Byung-Chul Han (2015) puts it, inside the ‘digital panopticon’ where our 
narcissistic desire for recognition in the opaque mirror of social media means we 
voluntary submit to the gaze of everyone else and obliterate our own privacy and 
autonomy?  
In this paper I want to investigate the problem of voluntary servitude as a way of 
grasping this subjective threshold upon which freedom and government coincide. I will 
do this through an exploration of Michel Foucault and Étienne de La Boétie, two figures 
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not often considered together, showing how the former drew, albeit in an oblique way, 
on the latter’s concept of voluntary servitude as a way of thinking through the 
paradoxical relationship between power, freedom and subjectivity. My argument is that 
Foucault’s theory of government as the ‘conduct of conduct’ - which he developed in the 
mid-late 1970s and pursued into the 1980s in his investigations of ethical conduct and 
practices of self-government – can best be understood as a reflection on the question of 
voluntary servitude. Voluntary servitude, a concept first proposed in the sixteenth 
century by La Boétie, refers to the free abandonment of one’s own freedom and the 
voluntary submission to power. The desire for one’s own domination was, for La Boétie, 
and for many others in his wake, one of the central mysteries of political power. Power 
did not rely primarily, if at all, on violence or coercion, but rather on people’s willing 
complicity with it. The question arising here is why people obey, even when it is often 
against their own interests to do so. 
My aim here is two-fold. First, it is to show that voluntary servitude is an ethical and 
political problem just as relevant today as it was when it was first diagnosed by La Boétie 
in the sixteenth century in his classic text Discourse on Voluntary Servitude. Secondly, it is to 
suggest that voluntary servitude can and should be interpreted in an emancipatory way, as 
a problematic that reveals the ontological primacy of freedom and the fragility and 
instability of power. The other side of voluntary servitude is what Foucault referred to as 
‘voluntary inservitude’ or the will to be free, something that can be expressed in different 
ways, from acts of resistance and civil disobedience to alternate modes of ethical conduct 
and association. 
My argument proceeds in four stages. First, I investigate the question of freedom in 
Foucault’s thinking, suggesting that there is a certain unresolved ambiguity in his 
understanding of the relationship between freedom, power and subjectivity. Secondly, I 
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seek to clarify this through a discussion of Foucault’s concept of critique, which is central 
to his notion of government and to practices of resistance to power. Here I focus on a 
crucial text from 1978, ‘What is Critique?’, which, I suggest, has as its background La 
Boétie’s concept of voluntary servitude. I then turn my attention to La Boétie, exploring 
his thesis about why people submit to tyrannical power, and drawing parallels here with 
Foucault’s notion of subjectification (assujettissement). I propose that La Boétie’s theory of 
servitude volontaire is a useful way of deciphering this concept and sheds further light on 
Foucault’s understanding of how power interacts with the subject. Finally, I offer an 
emancipatory reading of voluntary servitude, seeing in it not only a way of grasping the 
functioning of power – whether this is the power embodied in the classical figure of 
tyranny or in contemporary forms of biopolitical, neoliberal and communicative power – 
but also an ethical guide to resistance and disobedience.  
The problem of freedom in Foucault 
What place did freedom have in Foucault’s thought? If power is ‘everywhere’, if it is 
coextensive with all social relations, if it is to be found in everyday interactions between 
individuals, then what room is left for freedom? How can spaces for freedom be 
reconciled with the ubiquity of power relations, with the apparent omnipresence of 
disciplinary constraints and biopolitical control, with forms of power/knowledge that 
construct individuals as subjects and with governmental rationalities aimed at normalising 
behaviour? Foucault sees freedom as a kind of ‘game’ played with power, as a series of 
strategic moves that can take place within certain limits set by power. However, if this is 
the case, it would seem to offer only limited, bounded opportunities for freedom. 
Freedom, and the possibilities of resistance, would appear to be produced by, or at least 
realised through, the operation of power itself and are therefore always constrained by it.  
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The charge often made by Foucault’s critics was that he left no ground, whether 
ontological or normative, for an understanding of freedom uncontaminated by power 
(see Taylor 1984; Walzer 1986; Fraser 1989). This suspicion was further compounded by 
Foucault’s claim that one could never get beyond power; there would always be power 
relations because power was coextensive with any form of social organisation. 
Revolutions and liberation struggles would therefore not solve the problem of power (see 
2000a). All that could be hoped for was a relaxing of constraints, a modification or 
reconfiguration of power relations. Therefore, freedom could not be conceived of as a 
stable situation; it is not something that can be achieved in a complete form. One can 
never say with any confidence that one now lives in a ‘free society’. For Foucault this 
would simply be another regime of power imposed in the name of freedom. Therefore, 
as Foucault’s critics asked, if resistance to power merely exchanged one form of 
domination, one set of power relations with another, then why bother fighting for 
freedom at all? Foucault’s apparent pessimism about emancipation would seem to have 
removed any inducement to seek it at all. 
While many of these criticisms were misplaced, they nevertheless reflect a certain 
unresolved ambiguity surrounding the place and the significance of freedom in 
Foucault’s thought. While, I would argue, Foucault was deeply concerned with freedom 
and with expanding its limits and possibilities, it is often unclear how this concept should 
be understood. Obviously, freedom could not be thought as the absence of limit or 
constraint (ie. negative freedom). If we take the idea that freedom is only intelligible and 
realisable through its relation to power, then the notion of ‘freedom from’ power simply 
has no meaning for Foucault. Freedom and power are not polar opposites and do not 
exist in a zero-sum game, such that the absence of one is the condition for the presence 
of other (see also Han 2019). Rather, power and freedom have to be seen as existing in a 
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relationship of mutual incitement and provocation, an agonistic game of strategies and 
wills, where each opposes the other but is also the condition for the other’s existence 
(Foucault 2002: 326-348). Freedom is not a property, not an object one can strive after 
and finally possess. Rather, freedom must be constantly put to the test and made to 
confront the forms of power that both limit and constitute it. 
For Foucault, then, freedom and power presuppose one another. Power can only be 
exercised over a subject to whom is available a certain range of actions and choices, a 
field of possibilities that power seeks to limit, direct and control.(Foucault 2002: 341) 
Therefore, rather than seeing power as a top-down relationship of domination, or as 
involving coercion or violence, the operation of power is better thought of as 
‘conducting’, or leading and directing the behaviour of others; the ‘conduct of conduct’ 
(Foucault 2002: 341). This notion of power as the largely non-violent and non-coercive 
shaping of the actions of individuals is central to Foucault’s idea of ‘government’. 
Government is a strategic rationality aimed at the conduct of behaviour on both an 
individual and collective level. Foucault traces the genealogy of government back to early 
ideas of the Christian pastorate and monastic practices of obedience, but it became 
increasingly coextensive with broader society and was incorporated into the structures, 
calculations and practices of the modern state.(Foucault 2002: 334) 
In governing the behaviour of individuals in this way, in turning individuals into subjects 
through the direction of their freedom, the state may be understood as an ‘apparatus’, 
indeed one of many apparatuses in operation today. Following on from Foucault’s 
allusions to this term, Agamben defines an apparatus as ‘literally anything that has in 
some way the capacity to capture, orient, determine, intercept, model, control, or secure 
the gestures, behaviours, opinions, or discourses of living beings.’ (2009: 14). Of course, 
we could apply this to social media and internet communication technologies, to say 
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nothing of smart phones and apps that track our movements, monitor our health and 
measure our performance. Such devices, technologies and platforms manage a much 
more effective, sophisticated and all-encompassing government of behaviour than the 
modern state could ever dream of. Yet, the main point to be made here is that these 
apparatuses rely at the same time on a certain freedom on the part of the subjects, even, 
and especially, the freedom to renounce freedom and allow oneself to be captured. 
Apparatuses create subjects who assume their subjectivity as free subjects in the process of 
their own de-subjectification. Agamben characterises our contemporary condition as one 
of generalised submission to apparatuses: ‘the most docile and cowardly social body that 
has ever existed in human history… the harmless citizen of postindustrial democracies… 
readily does everything that he is asked to do, inasmuch as he leaves his everyday gestures 
and his health, his amusements and his occupations, his diet and his desires, to be 
commanded and controlled in the smallest detail by apparatuses.’ (22-23).  
In order to properly grasp the precise nature of the relationship between the subject, 
power and freedom, and indeed the functioning of modern governmental apparatuses, 
we must therefore come to terms with this phenomenon. The question of why people 
freely bind themselves to power; why they allow themselves to be subjectified by power 
and why, at other times, they resist this subjectification is a question that both Foucault 
and La Boétie are concerned with. 
‘Critique will be the art of voluntary inservitude’ 
To explore some of the parallels between Foucault and La Boétie (see also Schachter 
2016) I turn to a lecture that Foucault gave at the Sorbonne in May 1978 called ‘What is 
Critique?’ Here Foucault sought to explore the emergence in Western thought, dating 
roughly from the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries (crucially we should note that this is 
the time in which La Boétie was writing) of a certain ‘critical attitude’ that could be seen 
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as a response to the governmentalization of Western European societies during this 
period. The art of governing, central to the Christian pastorate and which, during the 
Middle Ages, had been confined largely to religious and monastic institutions, now 
becomes the general rationality of society, intervening in matters of family, social, 
economic and political life. As Foucault says, the fundamental question that presents 
itself during this period is how to govern (1996: 384).  
The Christian pastorate, which formed the basis of modern governmental rationality, is 
characterised by a relationship of obedience. As Foucault says: 
Christian obedience, the sheep’s obedience to his pastor, is therefore a complete 
obedience of one individual to another individual. What’s more, the person who 
obeys, the person who is subject to the order, is called the subditus, literally, he who 
is dedicated, given to someone else, and who is entirely at their disposition and 
subject to their will. It is a relationship of complete servitude (2007: 177). 
What is cherished in this relationship is obedience as the absence or relinquishment of 
willpower, particularly of the will over oneself.  
However, as Foucault shows, such pastoral relations of obedience are always 
accompanied by the possibility of disobedience. The religious heresies of the Middle 
Ages, for instance, disrupted the governing power of the Church through the 
promulgation of divergent, dissonant ideas, doctrines and ways of life. Amongst these, 
ascetism is perhaps the most important: it is a discipline to which one subjects oneself so 
that one cannot be so easily mastered by others, and it is therefore the very opposite of 
obedience. Here Foucault’s notion of ‘counter-conducts’ becomes important. If 
governing pastoral power is the power to conduct the actions, lives and souls of others in 
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the interests of their salvation, then counter-conducts are practices and ways of life that 
resist this governing power, that refuse the ways in which one is conducted by others. 
It is precisely the spirit of disobedience that re-emerges in the fifteenth and sixteenth 
centuries in response to the explosion of governmental practices and discourses. Thus, 
alongside the question of how to govern arises the opposing question of ‘how not to be 
governed?’ (Foucault 1996: 384). Foucault argues that this impulse to not be governed 
informs the critical spirit of Kant’s Aufklärung or Enlightenment, seen as mankind’s 
escape from a state of immaturity, in which one is governed heteronymously, into 
adulthood as the condition of autonomy. Later this same impulse will find its way into a 
critique of the excesses of rationalisation itself, associated with the excesses of state 
power; here Foucault is referring primarily to the Hegelian Left, Weber and the Frankfurt 
School.  
However, it is in the spirit of this heterodox reading of the Enlightenment that Foucault 
seeks to initiate what he calls a ‘historicophilosophical’ mode of enquiry. It proposes a 
historicisation of ideas, which makes possible a critical reflection upon the legitimacy of 
modern forms of knowledge and truth regimes. This is through what Foucault terms 
their ‘eventialization’ [événementialisation] (1996: 393), a way of unmasking the relationship 
between power and knowledge, of revealing the multiple coercions involved in a system 
of knowledge and a regime of truth becoming hegemonic. Yet, the question raised here is 
not so much how a system of knowledge and power is forced upon us but, rather, why 
and under what conductions does it become acceptable to us? Why do we come to 
regard as legitimate a mode of power/knowledge that prescribes an identity for us, or 
imposes upon us norms of behaviour or a certain truth of desire? What must be 
explored, in other words, is the mechanism by which we voluntarily bind and subject 
ourselves to a specific form of power through our internalisation of its regime of truth.  
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Because these regimes of truth can only become dominant through our free acceptance 
of them, this means that their emergence is contingent rather than inevitable, and thus 
subject to rupture, reversal and destabilization – or at least to an ongoing questioning of 
their legitimacy. As Foucault (1996: 395) says: ‘Bringing out the conditions of 
acceptability of a system and following the lines of rupture that mark its emergence are 
two correlative operations’. In other words, it is precisely because we freely subject 
ourselves to these regimes of power/knowledge/truth that they can, at the same time, be 
thought otherwise and undone. All apparatuses of power are therefore haunted by the 
possibility of their own disappearance. Power is an event rather than a transcendental, 
ahistorical essence - and all events can be reversed, superseded and transformed. Critique 
is therefore the practice of interrogating the limits of power, drawing attention to power’s 
impermanence and contingency, and thus to its possible illegitimacy. In this sense, it 
seeks to de-mystify power. In focussing on the how, rather than the what, of power – on 
how power works, what its effects are – Foucault sought to show that power did not 
actually exist as such, that it had no single, unified identity or essence (2002: 336-7). As I 
will argue, La Boétie, in a slightly different way, was making precisely the same point.  
Therefore, the implication of Foucault’s analysis is that freedom is the ontological basis 
of power. In other words, if power depends at some level on the subject’s free consent – 
on the will to obey – then this means that the overturning of power relations is also a 
matter of will, the will to be free, the will to disobey and to resist the various ways we 
have been subjectified. Here Foucault refers to a ‘decisive will to not be governed’: 
If governmentalization is really this movement concerned with subjugating 
individuals in the very reality of a social practice by mechanisms of power that 
appeal to a truth, I will say that critique is the movement through which the 
subject gives itself the right to question truth concerning its power effects and to 
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question power about its discourses of truth. Critique will be the art of voluntary 
inservitude, of reflective indocility (1996: 386 [emphasis added]). 
La Boétie and the problem of voluntary servitude 
Yet, to grasp the significance of this idea of voluntary inservitude, we need to understand 
more precisely the problem of voluntary servitude itself. This requires an investigation of 
Étienne de La Boétie and his famous text, Discours de la Servitude Volontaire. La Boétie was 
a French writer and poet in the humanist tradition, confidant and friend of Montaigne, 
and later a member of the Parlement of Bordeaux. His essay on voluntary servitude, 
written around 1549, thereafter had a complex and ambiguous history, being circulated 
by Hugenots and monarchomachs who used it as propaganda in their struggle against the 
French crown. It has been seen as call to resistance against unjust tyrannical rule, and has 
had a major influence on the ideas of political dissent and civil disobedience (see Bleiker 
2000) and on the anarchist tradition (see Newman 2016; Kinna 2019). La Boétie is an 
important figure for French social theory, including amongst thinkers like Marcel 
Gauchet, Claude Lefort and Pierre Clastres (see Moyn 2005). Moreover, the concept of 
voluntary servitude has been utilized in studies not only of political domination under 
totalitarian systems (see Lefort 2007), but also of the Silicon Valley ideology (see Vion-
Dury 2016), as well as the sociology of the modern workplace (see Chaiznot 2012). 
In the Discourse, La Boétie (1975: 42) asks one very simple question: 
For the present I should like to understand how it happens that so many men, so 
many villages, so many cities, so many nations, sometimes suffer under a single 
tyrant who has no other power than the power they give him; who is able to 
harm them only to the extent to which they have the willingness to bear with 
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him; who could do them absolutely no injury unless they preferred to put up with 
him rather than contradict him.  
According to La Boétie, our obedience to the tyrant is not coerced but freely given. We 
willingly submit to his authority and allow him to abuse us. We voluntarily abandon our 
own freedom and render it up to this one figure who comes to dominate us. The power 
the tyrant wields over us is only the power we freely endow him with. This phenomenon 
cannot be explained by cowardice: in the situation thus described, the people outnumber 
the solitary figure of the tyrant to such an extent that cowardice cannot account for their 
submission. They could easily overpower him if they chose, but do not do so. Instead, 
they voluntarily sacrifice their own freedom and choose to live as slaves: ‘A people 
enslaves itself, cuts its own throat, when, having the choice between being vassals and 
free men, it deserts its liberties and takes on the yoke, gives consent to its own misery, or, 
rather, apparently welcomes it.’ (46) Something other than cowardice must be at work 
here – a strange psychological mechanism, a moral sickness or vice that La Boétie is 
confounded by: ‘What monstrous vice, then, is this which does not even deserve to be 
called cowardice, a vice for which no term can be found vile enough, which nature 
herself disavows and our tongues refuse to name?’ (44) The Discourse thus overturns 
standard notions of consent that claim that it is natural and rational to obey authority; for 
La Boétie, voluntary consent is a genuine puzzle. 
However, in La Boétie’s analysis, freedom is ontologically primary; it comes before 
power. Freedom, and the natural bonds of companionship and equality that go along 
with it, is seen as a natural moral condition. Like Foucault (2003) after him, La Boétie 
rejects justifications of power based on social contract theory. Indeed, this whole 
rationalisation of submission is reversed: rather than an original state of war, which 
compels us to seek the security of a sovereign political order, we first enjoy the freedom 
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and equality, and the plurality and singularity endowed by nature, and then for some 
reason we renounce it and have been slaves ever since. For La Boétie, people suddenly 
and quite voluntarily switch from freedom to servitude. Our relinquishment of freedom 
comes about as a result of apathy or laziness – we find it easier to obey than to resist. 
But, at the same time, La Boétie suggests that voluntary servitude is active rather than 
passive; it is something we continuously, even energetically and enthusiastically, 
participate in. Our submission is something that is renewed through our everyday 
behaviours and interactions: ‘you make yourselves weak so that he [the tyrant] can be 
strong and oppress you ever more harshly.’ (1975: 44) 
La Boétie proposes, tentatively, three possible factors that might explain this 
phenomenon. Firstly, he says that people become habituated into servitude, such that 
they forget that they were ever free. Obedience and docility become a matter of habit (a 
‘habituation to subjection’ as he puts it); this ‘moulds us into its own shape, whatever our 
natural disposition.’ (49) This seems to resonate with Foucault’s idea of the ‘docile 
bodies’ that have been trained, moulded and shaped in the disciplinary regimes of 
modernity. To what extent would this power be possible without the subjectification of 
the subject, such that he or she actively desires and willingly participates in his own 
disciplining and normalisation?  
Second, La Boétie refers to the power of spectacles:  
Theatres, games, farces, spectacles, gladiators, strange beasts, medals, tableaux 
and other such drugs were the bait that lured ancient nations into servitude, they 
were the price at which freedom was sold, they were the instruments of tyranny; 
they were the methods, the procedures, the allurements which ancient tyrants 
could use to put their people to sleep, to place them under the yoke. (58)  
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Third, La Boétie shows how power constructs for itself a hierarchy of relations in which 
the tyrant’s place is sustained by intricate networks and relations of dependency. The 
tyrant’s power lies not in coercion and violence, but rather in a complex ecosystem: those 
immediately surrounding the tyrant, his advisers and councilors, who in turn maintain a 
network of dependents, below whom are hundreds if not thousands of others, each with 
a place within this pyramid of power. Thus, the power of the tyrant is really based on an 
interlocking system of relations of fear and dependency that includes many thousands of 
people who are all complicit in their own domination. Our submission and obedience are 
assured by payoffs we receive from those immediately above us; we submit to the power 
of another in return for our own unhappy place in the structure of power (72). 
The illusion of power 
How should we interpret La Boétie’s theory of voluntary servitude? To some extent, his 
explanations for this phenomenon are inadequate. Moreover, the idea that people 
voluntary surrender their power has often been interpreted in a pessimistic, even 
conservative and authoritarian way.2 However, I would propose here a more radical and 
emancipatory reading of La Boétie’s text, one that aligns with Foucault’s critical, non-
essentialist understanding of power. Indeed, the Discourse should be regarded as a call to 
freedom, as a way rousing us from a state of servility and enfeeblement - in the same way 
that Foucault reads Kant’s Aufklarung as a way of rousing humanity out of a state of 
immaturity. In a similar way to Foucault, La Boétie reveals the hollowness and instability 
at the heart of power. If, in other words, power is only sustained through our ongoing 
free consent, then, ultimately, power is a kind of constitutive illusion, one that we have 
retroactively created through our recognition of it. The power of the tyrant is only our 
power in an alienated form: 
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Where has he acquired enough eyes to spy upon you, if you do not provide them 
yourselves? How can he have so many arms to beat you with, if he does not 
borrow them from you? The feet that trample down your cities, where does he 
get them if they are not your own? How does he have any power over you except 
through you? How would he dare assail you if he had no cooperation from you? 
(48)  
By unmasking this dimension of voluntary servitude as the foundation of power, La 
Boétie, like Foucault, aims at a de-mystification of power. To see power in this way is to 
strip away its abstractions and to reveal the freedom that it is founded upon. 
Of course, unlike La Boétie, Foucault would not trace voluntary servitude to one obscure 
but fateful historical moment, to a fall from our original state of freedom; rather, there 
has only been self-subjection in specific ways to specific regimes of truth and power. 
Nevertheless, the fundamental insight is the same: that all forms of power, no matter 
how they are historically constituted, depend at some level on our willing acquiescence. 
La Boétie’s text might be seen as the key that allows us to unlock the eternal mystery of 
power; it shows us that power cannot exist without our own subjection to it. It sheds 
light on the threshold of subjectification that Foucault saw as the underside of any power 
relationship: why does the subject allow herself to be attached to certain modes of 
individualization, to be judged according to certain norms, to have her actions and 
behaviour directed towards certain goals? 
La Boétie’s text thus serves to remind us of our own will: how we lost it, and how we can 
regain it. There is a clear connection here with Foucault’s ‘decisive will not to be governed’, 
which, for him, is the basis of all critique. The other side of voluntary servitude is 
therefore voluntary inservitude; the other side to power is freedom. The Discourse on 
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Voluntary Servitude is, like Foucault’s work, an ethical meditation on freedom and its 
possibilities. 
The discipline of indiscipline 
In the final section, I would like to briefly explore three possible ways of understanding 
this notion of freedom as the release from voluntary servitude. These strategies are what 
I refer to as the discipline of indiscipline, as they involve practices of self-discipline or self-
mastery, understood in both an ethical and political sense. My point here is the practice 
of voluntary inservitude or, simply, freedom is not a spontaneous act but rather a 
conscious and deliberate work on the self, a reconstitution of desires and a re-direction 
of the will that takes place at the level of the subject. 
Firstly, and most obviously, we can understand voluntary inservitude in terms of acts of 
civil disobedience. La Boétie’s thesis has been influential in the tradition of non-violent 
resistance and civil disobedience.. La Boétie urges peaceful resistance to the power of the 
tyrant. Indeed, the Discourse can be read as an ethical guide to disobedience. Disobedience 
need not take the form of a violent uprising, but is rather an individual and collective act 
of self-emancipation in which people turn their backs on the tyrant, refuse to recognise 
his power over them and instead empower themselves. La Boétie says that if we want to 
free ourselves from the power of the tyrant, all we need do is take back our power – that 
is, to stop empowering him, to stop giving ourselves over to him. If we no longer 
recognise the authority of the tyrant, and instead recognise our own power, then the spell 
of power is broken and the tyrant falls of his own accord. It is merely a matter of 
volition, of ‘willing to be free’: ‘Resolve to serve no more, and you are at once freed. I do 
not ask that you place hands upon the tyrant to topple him over, but simply that you 
support him no longer; then you will behold him, like a great Colossus whose pedestal 
has been pulled away, fall of his own weight and break into pieces?’ (La Boétie 48-49)  
 16 
Foucault’s interest in the Iranian Revolution (1978-79), the event that forms the political 
background to ‘What is Critique?’, was to do with the question of the will in resisting 
power, particularly the will to risk one’s life for freedom. For Foucault, the will is 
something that positions the individual in a certain relationship to his or her own 
subjectivity. At times, he says, there is the will to be a slave; at other times, there is the 
will to be free and to risk death for freedom (Foucault 2016: 41). These two dimensions 
of the will are the two sides of the same phenomenon of voluntary servitude. While this 
idea of dying for freedom does not really figure in La Boétie’s account, and while, 
furthermore, La Boétie does not deal with any of the practical implications and real costs 
associated with mass organised dissent,there is the same concern with the importance of 
reorienting the will of the subject from servitude to freedom. Recent protests and 
insurrections against police violence and racism that have been taking place around the 
world, in the midst of the pandemic, show a similar willingness to risk life for freedom, 
and might be seen as collective acts of voluntary inservitude. 
Secondly, voluntary inservitude involves an ethical transformation of the self, even a 
form of ethical self-discipline. For Foucault, the subjectivity that power creates for us is 
also the material from which we can resist power and from which we can fashion for 
ourselves new ways of being. But this involves an ethical work conducted upon the self, a 
conscious practice of self-constitution. Foucault’s (see 1988; 2005; 2010) later interest in 
the idea of the ‘care of the self’ in ancient Greece and Rome – referring to practices such 
as ‘ascesis’ (ascetism) - was to do with the ways in which individuals sought to discipline 
themselves, to master their own desires. The goal here was a certain form of ethical self-
mastery, the attempt to govern one’s desires and instincts, to impose one’s will upon 
them, in the name of greater autonomy. Autonomy might be understood in two senses 
here. Firstly, while these practices of self-discipline were a reflection of the cultural forms 
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and norms that existed at the time, they were nevertheless much more autonomous, 
precisely because they were self-imposed, than the institutionalised (religious, psychiatric, 
medical) modes and practices of discipline that emerged later with the Christian pastorate 
and have continued, in different forms, into modernity. Foucault sees these alternative, 
non-institutional processes of self-disciplining or self-fashioning as an ethical practice, 
which is always related to the practice of freedom (2000: 284). Secondly, this sort of 
ethical self-discipline was a way of coming to terms with the problem of voluntary 
servitude, which is essentially the abandonment of the will. As both Foucault and La 
Boétie recognised, there are tendencies within us, certain desires and dependencies that 
make one more susceptible to the power of others. La Boétie saw voluntary servitude a 
kind of weakness, a moral sickness, a wayward and inexplicable desire, born of laziness, 
habit, distraction or induced through the false promise of riches and favours. Practices of 
self-discipline are aimed at controlling such tendencies, so that one would not be so 
susceptible to being disciplined and governed by others. In other words, they are a way 
of rediscovering or reconstructing the will. As Foucault puts it: ‘the concern for the self 
and care of the self were required for right conduct and the proper practice of freedom, 
in order to know oneself… as well as to form oneself, to surpass oneself, to master the 
appetites that threaten to overwhelm one.’ (2000: 285)  
Of course, there are important differences between Foucault and La Boétie here on this 
question of self-constitution. Whereas La Boétie’s account of the subject’s submission to 
power is largely ahistorical, Foucault is much more concerned with the specific practices 
of subject-constitution that emerged in different historical periods and cultural contexts, 
practices and understandings of the self that cannot be universalised or essentialised, 
which are, indeed, untranslatable from one historical period to another. Whereas La 
Boétie is concerned with the universal condition of humanity – its self-enslavement and 
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its self-emancipation – Foucault is interested in specific historical practices of freedom 
and self-cultivation; for him, there is no universal subject destined for freedom. 
Nevertheless, the point I am trying to make in drawing a parallel between these thinkers 
is to emphasise the different ways in which they both come to terms with the same 
problem: how the will to be free, to resist domination, can form within the subject.  
For Foucault, one such way of cultivating this will was through the ancient practice of 
parrhesia. This is not only because parrhesia was understood as a form of free and fearless 
speech – an ancient form of speaking truth to power – and therefore carried great 
personal risk, as Plato discovered when he gave unwelcome philosophical counsel to 
Dionysius, the tyrant of Syracuse. According to Foucault, parrhesia was also a form of 
ethical subjectivation in which, in the act of ethically committing oneself to telling the 
truth, regardless of the consequences, it was also a way of ‘freely binding oneself to 
oneself, and in the form of a courageous act’ (2010: 66 [emphasis added]) In other words, 
truth-telling brings into play the will to be free and to stake one’s life on this act – to 
identify absolutely with the truth of one’s discourse and to bear the risks associated with 
it. It is thus a reversal of one’s will to be a slave, to remain silent. This notion of risk is 
central to Foucault’s idea that freedom must always be understood agonistically, as a testing 
of the limits of power, limits which are both external to the subject, as well as internal, in 
the sense of constituting his or her desires and identity. To speak freely and fearlessly was 
therefore a mode of ethical self-constitution as a free subject.  
Finally, the discipline of indiscipline is associative – it always involves ethical (and political) 
relations with others and is always practiced in association with others. La Boétie defines 
tyranny as the rule of the one over the many, the antidote to which is the reaffirmation of 
the natural relations of equality and plurality – what Miguel Abensour (2011) refers to as 
the ‘all ones’ (tous un). The condition for freedom in La Boétie is a kind of shared 
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plurality, in which singularity is preserved even in collective association with others. Here 
La Boétie stresses the value of friendship as the ethical counterpoint to tyranny: 
‘Friendship is a sacred word, a holy thing; it is never developed except between persons 
of character, and never takes root except through mutual respect; it flourishes not so 
much by kindnesses as by sincerity.’ (77) By contrast the tyrant is a lonely figure without 
friends. The only relations he has are ones based on dependency, fear and self-interest 
(La Boétie 77). Foucault (2000b) also spoke of the radical possibilities of friendship, 
particularly within gay communities. Friendship as a way life shared between individuals 
of different ages, social status, professions and cultures, could become the basis of new 
ethical relations, new forms of community and association, and indeed new modes of 
subjectivity that escape institutionalised and normalised relations and identities.3 
The problem of voluntary servitude has no doubt become more complex and enigmatic 
under contemporary regimes of neoliberalism. Neoliberalism is a rationality and a way of 
life in which individuals are governed through their own freedom: freedom is the 
threshold upon which the subject’s actions and behaviours are conducted in certain ways 
and directed towards certain ends specified by the market. According to Foucault, this 
new mode of governance penetrates into the very soul of the individual, who is remade 
as homo economicus – a free individual who has internalised the imperatives of the market 
and who thus becomes ‘an entrepreneur of himself’, permanently accountable to the 
market norms and social processes which produce him. (Foucault 2008: 226) We are no 
doubt very far here from La Boetie’s antique model of tyranny, in which the structure of 
domination, and therefore the ‘target’ of resistance, is more straightforward.  
However, as I have endeavoured to show, although both thinkers have different 
accounts of how power actually operates, their approach to the problem of government 
is inspired by the same question: why does the subject freely internalise, and thus 
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reproduce, the forms of power that constrain him; and how can this self-domination be 
reversed? Here both thinkers understand resistance – whether collective or individual – 
primarily as a kind of ethical revolt against oneself that brings a halt to the subject’s voluntary 
servitude and allows the will to be reconstituted. Perhaps this is how we should interpret 
Foucault’s proposal that: ‘Maybe the target nowadays is not to discover what we are but 
to refuse what we are…’ (2002: 336) 
Conclusion 
 
Contemporary neoliberalism – or perhaps what is more accurately referred to as 
authoritarian neoliberalism (see Brown 2019) – displays two faces of power today, 
sovereign power and algorithmic power, the coercive of the state and the surveillance 
and governing power of big data. It is my contention that both apparatuses or dispositifs 
of power can be better grasped through the problematic of voluntary servitude I have 
developed in this paper. 
Recent debates about government measures in response to Covid-19 have reflected 
concerns about the problem of domination and obedience in contemporary societies. In 
the early days of the lockdown imposed in Italy, Agamben controversially argued that 
such restrictions were entirely disproportionate and excessive, constituting a sovereign 
state of exception that was becoming normalised: ‘First and foremost, what is once again 
manifest is the tendency to use a state of exception as a normal paradigm for 
government.’ (2020) The biopolitical imperative that life be preserved at all costs led, 
according to Agamben, to the readiness to sacrifice basic freedoms, normal social 
interactions, and any sense of ethical dignity. Leaving aside the debates ensuing from 
these comments, which were seen to be downplaying the seriousness of the virus (see 
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Benvenuto 2020; Berg 2020), Agamben, rightly in my view, points not only to the 
dangerous precedent set by these emergency measures which, one year on, have already 
become a routine feature of everyday life, but also to the way that they have been 
accepted and willingly complied with by a majority of citizens without any real 
questioning of their efficacy or legitimacy: ‘Therefore, in a perverse vicious circle, the 
limitations of freedom imposed by governments are accepted in the name of a desire for 
safety that was created by the same governments that are now intervening to satisfy it.’ 
(2020) 
There is a similar degree of complacency when it comes to new forms of biopolitical and 
biometric surveillance implemented or currently being proposed in response to the 
pandemic – from contact tracing apps to digital vaccine passports.4 The acceptance of 
these technologies, and the degree of control they will give over our lives not only to 
governments but to big tech firms, is part of a more general problem of what might be 
called algorithmic power – that is, the way that life, in contemporary societies, is 
governed or ‘conducted’, as Foucault would put it, through computer algorithms and 
data analytics, particularly on social media, that track movements, monitor interactions, 
online behaviours, interests and spending habits and direct individual preferences, even 
political preferences. This points to a new age of authoritarian capitalism, or what 
Shoshana Zuboff (2019) calls ‘surveillance capitalism’, unhinged from any kind of 
democratic control or accountability. However, as commentators like Byung Chul-Han 
(2015) have pointed out, this control and surveillance exercised over us, particularly on 
social media, is something we freely consent to and cooperate with; the digital web in 
which we are caught in we spin through our everyday interactions (see Romele et al., 
2017). A similar point is made by the Zygmunt Bauman who, in his consideration of the 
new modes of ‘liquid surveillance’ – digital and biometric technologies – argues that the 
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tendency of power in contemporary societies has shifted from the governors to the 
governed, who no longer need to be coerced or mastered by some top-down force 
because they voluntarily give up their desire for freedom and freely participate in their 
own domination (Bauman and Lyons 2013: 52-3). Foucault might consider this a kind of 
digital pastorate, a new way of governing people through their own freedom (see Cooper 
2020). In an age when we willingly consent, in the name of convenience, to myriad forms 
of digital surveillance, biometrics, and the RFID microchipping of products, credit cards, 
clothes and even of our own bodies (see Hayles 2009; Metz 2018), it would appear that 




In this paper, I have proposed the idea of voluntary servitude as a theoretical framework 
for understanding the ethical and political problem of government. I have argued that the 
best way to understand freedom and its possibilities today is to start with the problem of 
its abandonment. In drawing together La Boétie and Foucault, and in showing how the 
latter’s notions of government, freedom and subjectification might be better grasped 
through the thinking of the former, I have sought to outline an ethics and a politics of 
freedom as voluntary inservitude – a concept that is useful for understanding acts of 
resistance, counter-conduct and civil disobedience through which subjectivity is 
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1 Weber (2004: 35) defined charismatic authority as being based on acquiescence and 
submission to the personality of a demagogic leader, something people feel ‘called’ to do: 
‘People do not submit to them because of any customs or statutes, but because they 
believe in them.’ But the question left unanswered in Weber’s analysis - which is really La 
Boétie’s question - is why people believe in these rulers and place themselves in thraldom 
to what are often unremarkable individuals; this is the voluntary act of submission that 
retrospectively constitutes their charisma (La Boétie 1975: 44). 
2 For a discussion of the various readings of voluntary servitude see Abensour (2011).  
3 A similar point is made by Paul B. Preciado (2020) who talks about the possibilities of 
resistance to the biopolitical measures and technologies of control, surveillance and 
communication to which we have been subjected in the context of the Covid-19 
pandemic. There are practices of resistance and subjectification that we can learn from 
sexual minorities. This would involve creating new forms of collective subjectivity 
through global cooperation, as well as the refusal of certain technologies. Here Preciado 
invokes a kind of voluntary biopolitical mutation, which can be seen as a form of 
voluntary inservitude: ‘Just as the virus mutates, if we want to resist submission, we must 
also mutate. We must go from a forced mutation to a chosen mutation.’  
 
4 The introduction of a new contact tracing app in France ignited concerns about ‘digital 
tyranny’ and led one MP to condemn its implementation as a form of ‘voluntary 
servitude’ (Marlowe 2020). 
                                                 
